The mutation of the world order is revealing some progressive or liberal ideas of the world yesterday. They are naive or, directly, bad ideas. Making them emerge may help to face better whatever it is to come.
How not to defend the European model. Every time there are serious turbulence in the international order, something that I dare to call European nationalism emerges. The mechanism works more or less like that. JD Vance, for example, says that Europe is obsolete, which is decadent or something similar. They go out in Tromba commentators and politicians to say that they feel proudly European or that no one as Europe represents true civilization. It is not the most dangerous of the manifestations of Eurocentrism, but probably the most pathetic. Instead of claiming the political virtues of the European model, the European virtues of the political model are claimed. Defensive alocutions from the intelligentsia European begin with a “as Europeans, such and which.” Well no. It is not “as Europeans” that we must answer: the opposite of Trumpian nationalism is not European nationalism. Today, as always, the opposite of nationalism is anti-nationalism. And the (bad) called European model must be defended from solidarity among the peoples of the world, not from European identity.
The role of the rules. The alliance between gringos progressive and the rest of progressive is distorted by the different function assigned to the rules. Progressives who are not gringos see in the rules system a fair way to horizontally order the world; Gringos progressives see in that a fair way to order the world vertically, that is, a fair way to achieve and preserve world hegemony. What irritates gringo progressive liberalism is not only that China aspires to be the first power, but that it is achieved by violating the rules of the game (representative democracy, fundamental rights, labor rights, respect consistent with WTO, etc.). Until they stop understanding the hierarchically, it cannot be said that gringos and the rest are genuine allies in the noble project of ordering the world through rules.
Less histrionism is no less imperialism. In The Long GameRush Doshi – one of the architects of the Biden administration in relations with China – reconstructs one of those eastern philosophical discussions that so much fascinate Westerners. It’s about how to interpret a phrase – almost a proverb – repeatedly cited by the great Chinese contemporary political leaders: “Hide your strengths and wait for your time” (Tao Guang Yang Hui). The discussion, for once, does not emerge only when the flight of the orsh of Minerva raises the flight. Unraveling it is to discover what the true plan of China is in the global order. There are those who believe it is practically an ideal of life and that “your moment” is awaited “is a perpetual vital state. Translated in political terms: China does not aspire to displace the United States as the first world power. He aspires, without exhibitionisms, to greater progressive well -being, but does not want to dominate the world. Then there are those who, like the author of the book, believe that it must be understood not as an abstract philosophy of political life, but as a specific practical advice: the real scope of the forces themselves must be hidden and deny all maximum ambition to advise, given the ideal circumstances, the definitive blow. Political translation: China has been preparing for the world scepter for decades, but denying the greatest. Until now. He saw in him crash of 2008, in Trump’s election in 2016, in the management of the pandemic in 2020 and in Trump’s second election in 2024 a chain of events that announced the American decline. You don’t have to wait for the moment. But should we celebrate the eventual fall of the Gringo Empire? Of course, the discretion and wisdom that are intuited in those who repeat “hide your strengths and await your moment” contrasts with the histrionic show of destruction, abuse and chulería of Trump (and some of their predecessors). But, if Doshi is right, Xi Jinping would only be building a comparatively less histrionic empire. It is not precisely a decisive gain, especially if China wanted to export its entire model and not only its wise proverbs. In any case, seeing yourself in the Brete to have to choose between empires is really tragic.
Neither industrial capitalism is poor, nor financial or cognitive capitalism is rich. In a recent interview, the influential journalist Thomas Friedman – adalid of the progressive liberalism gringo – said, before the Trumpian promise to reindustrialize the United States, that he did not want the American offshore to manufacture cars, but to design them. It is a perfect example of what I call “the fetish of declasso.” Under its influence, it is assumed that cognitive work is more worthy than manual work. Ascending in the social pyramid is moving from this. But there is nothing progressive to move from industrial capitalism to financial or cognitive capitalism. And the reason is quite obvious: in this imaginary, it is always needed that there are radically unadvantaged people because these will be the ones who do manual work (artificial intelligence will eliminate many manual works, yes, but it will not eliminate manual work consisting of assembling robots and machines that “incarnate” artificial intelligence). Systematically transferring manual work to the next poorer in the social or global chain is to conceive the world as a trophic chain. I don’t see how a progressive could accept such a thing. You have to challenge the fetish of declasso. And a way of starting to do so is to create a political culture in which the reduction of salary inequalities between cognitive work and manual work is justified. This would imply that remunerative differences due to qualified and unqualified work should be much lower than we usually believe. And one can believe that merit exists without believing in meritocracy. Having challenged the fetish of the declassious before the consensus of Washington, the relocation of factories and the exploitation of workers in the countries of the so -called Global South would have found, perhaps, more opposition.
attack strengths, not weak, of your rival. Michael Ignatieff took this lesson from his failed political experience in Canada: we must not attack the weak points of your adversary because they will reveal themselves. Attacking them would be to invest a precious time that should be dealt with in other needs, these necessary. You have to attack the strengths of your adversary because, unlike weaknesses, they will not harm it unless you show them. Progressive liberals invest a huge amount of time to criticize Trump’s tariff policy. But this was revealed from the first moment as something self -injured. It is one of its weak points. You have to attack your strengths. And one of them is that, by strange vericuetos, Trump sensed that the fetish of the declassado no longer enjoyed the prestige of yesteryear. And transformed it into nationalist resentment. It is necessary to create a progressive political culture that challenges the fetish of declasso without appealing to nostalgia. This could consist of Trump’s strong point. And what is worth against Trump, is worth against its imitators in the rest of the world.
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