Any systems engineer knows that the devil walks between the details and, especially, in the interfaces. The latter are the headache of the integrator, who must build a complex system formed from multiple subsystems, sets and elements that can each have a different design authority, that is, an owner of the solution. particular technological of each incorporated part. The point is: parameters such as quality, reliability, maintainability, life cycle cost and availability of a military system are proportional to the quality, reliability, etc., of the worst performing component, which affects guarantees , corporate image of the integrator (not the partial supplier) and the system as a whole.
The experience of integrating certain subsystems has proven to be a real headache, from the main weapons to communications equipment, information systems for command and control or simulators. In development, conflicts and interferences are our daily bread: given that many military platforms constitute a system of systems in themselves, mastery of project management and systems engineering methodologies should be required of everyone. the participants, both on the administration side (contracting body, life cycle managers and users), and on the supplier side.
In the military industry, the definition of interfaces is the critical task of engineering because, for example, once the oscillating mass of a battle tank or an on-board mortar is available, the complicated thing is to adapt it to the platform, its sensors and systems. of information and communications taking into account space and ergonomic limitations and restrictions (in manned systems). As engineers, we know very well the difficulty of dealing with physical or logical interferences between the parts of a system and transmitting them to the logistics chain and to the users, who must take charge of the system, knowing its operation and the operational limits of each and every one of its components. items.
Perhaps the keel provision concept implemented in our glorious Navy for centuries is an excellent approximation to the success of the development, verification and validation phases of military systems. With this, development and integration engineers count on the user from minute zero of design and execution and can reduce the number of inconsistencies and errors in projects. Otherwise, we will make products made by engineers for engineers.
In the Spanish military industry it happens that the series are relatively small and, when they are not, as is the case of VCR 8×8 dragon, the number of versions means that each batch has to be treated differently, as if they were different projects. Although we want to unify small batches based on standardization, operational needs force us to adapt the products: thus, we have in service 105 mm howitzers with two tube lengths, 155 mm with two different chamber volumes, automatic weapons for vehicles 30 mm combat for the VCI (Mauser or Bushmaster), 25 mm for the VEC and 27 mm for the Eurofighter, different tense shooting cannons for the Leopard/Leopard and Centauro, or 5” differentiated between the F105 and F110. Not even a modular design, so common in other industrial sectors, would help us improve the situation.
Another issue is the new international developments: until now snipers used 7.62×51, 12.7×99 (.50 BMG) or 20 mm ammunition – also the Russian calibers 12.7×108 or 14.5×114 – and combat units the same 7.62, 12.70 or 5.56 x 45 in its different versions (tracer, perforator…). But lo and behold, the American army is adopting the 6.8×51 mm caliber and the .338 (8.58 mm) as new ammunition (NATO?) and is already working on projectiles that will allow effective ranges of 3 km for rifles. of precision, which implies substantial changes in current production lines… and the problem with small-caliber ammunition is not its manufacturing, but rather achieving a competitive production cost, something that can only be achieved with very good manufacturing chains. balanced and a stable volume of orders that makes it possible to make profitable the enormous investments necessary, which requires thinking about the global market; Copper and brass are not at their lowest prices, precisely.
The conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Sahel have made it mission impossible to find nitrocellulose-based gunpowders on the international market. Countries with the capacity to nitrate cellulose maintain their production capacities for themselves, while the industry that does not have this capacity is being forced to stop its manufacturing lines while waiting for better times. The same occurs with many of the components that are incorporated into operating weapons systems, whether electronic, mechanical or explosive. There is a palpable shortage of critical elements, from armor steel or microprocessors to conventional ammunition, rocket or missile. Europe has emptied its magazines and reserves and has realized that, if the situation continues, its military capacity may be revealed.
Many of the components assembled by the large military industry come from small specialized companies. Sometimes the design authority is the integrator himself, so the supplier acts as a subcontractor by producing to the buyer’s specifications. On other occasions, the supplier manufactures to its own specifications, so it becomes a supplier. For small industries, the ideal is to act as a supplier and not as a subcontractor, as this will allow you to maintain design authority as your own and will make it easier for you to evolve and innovate on the products in your catalog. Otherwise, if you work as a subcontractor, you will be prohibited from introducing improvements to the product as its design depends on the integrating client.
He British Ministry of Defense It once set the goal that a minimum of 80% of the components of the systems it acquires were of national origin. Spain has set it at 70%. But how is the percentage of national elements measured? in weigh? in quantity? in economic value? If it is in weight, by manufacturing the barge of a car in Spain we already have the objective covered, even if the steel is French or Swedish. If in quantity, we should manufacture chain links, shoes and screws. If in economic value, we have a problem, because communications and weapons are the most expensive… and almost none of them are nationally manufactured. The goal of national content in the new military systems is very difficult to achieve; perhaps that is why it is not verified before accepting new equipment.
Who reaps the benefits given that 75% of the Spanish military industry is in foreign hands? In principle, they are companies that pay their taxes in Spain and their workers contribute in national territory; They create and maintain qualified, stable and well-paid jobs and allow the maintenance of an industrial network of suppliers and subcontractors. But does the profit after taxes travel outside our borders or is it reinvested in Spain? We must take into account that 85% of the national market falls on seven large companies and of them only Indra and Navantia They have Spanish capital; GDELS-SBS, Airbus, Rheinmetall, FMG and Nammo They are another story.
When the percentage of foreign components is very high, such as missiles, cannons or the combat system of a frigate, it becomes very difficult to achieve a satisfactory level of local equipment. In the case of an airplane, such as A400M, whose design authority is a multinational, things become enormously complicated, since clients outside the consortium often set part of the equipment that their orders must incorporate in order to nationalize them. In these cases, it is very difficult to determine precisely the real participation of the Spanish industry. The same thing happens in artificial satellites, whether defense or not, and many other systems.
The solution that started the program AMX30 It allowed the acquisition of new industrial capacities in Spain and facilitated the industrial return of the investment effort. The offsets or industrial compensations of that program were capital to modernize part of the Spanish industry, which was soon joined by naval construction (Príncipe de Asturias, frigates…), aeronautical (C101, C212…), rifle construction (CETME), rockets ( Teruel, MC25, Instalaza) and an armored vehicle that is still in service today: the BMR/VEC. Other acquisitions were a disappointment, such as the case of the Aníbal-Santana, which is currently being updated based on a Chinese commercial vehicle (!). Currently, missiles, training aircraft, tactical radios and other systems have been purchased without the return on investment in the national industry having been barely noticed.
According to him Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), although Spain has some manufacturing capacity in the defense sector, only Navantia is among the 100 largest companies in the world. In fact, since the Ukrainian war began, European countries have doubled their arms imports, while the United States and France have maintained their exports; In parallel, those of the Russian Federation have fallen drastically due to the enormous self-consumption involved in the war effort that began in 2022.
And the key question is: when selling a Spanish company to a foreign one, who becomes the authority for product and process design? And another one: some important factories work on land and properties of the Ministry of Defense, such as Murcia, Trubia, Granada or Palencia: what return does Spain receive for the transfer of these facilities? And one more: is the cultural, artistic and military architectural heritage stored in these facilities perfectly guarded or is it only “inventoryed” in Bibliodef and other databases?
Conclusion: the Defense Industrial Strategy (EID) establishes that the investments to be made in defense procurement programs must be optimized. To this end, the request and monitoring of industrial plans associated with each program is an unquestionable requirement, especially in those that involve strategic industrial capabilities, including the greatest number of companies with a collaborative and co-responsible spirit.
Complying with and enforcing what is established in the EID is a work of years. We hope that integrators and suppliers will be strengthened by the correct development of the industrial policies set by the Ministries of Defense and Industry. Having larger budgets or relying on the urgency to recover, improve or acquire new capabilities should not be the excuse to ignore what is established in the EID.
The key: careful attention to SMEs – which act as true innovative vectors in any industrial sector -, reduction of entry barriers to the sector (relaxation of applicable regulations), control of national participation in each procurement program and correct financial planning of the life cycle of the systems in operation… in addition to the promotion of exports as a guarantee of having production volumes that facilitate competitiveness and private investment in R&D&I.
It will never be too late to look for a better and newer world, if we put courage and hope in the effort.
Alfred Tennyson (1809-1892) English poet.
