One hundred days were enough to make it clear that Donald Trump’s return to the White House is not a simple continuation of his first mandate, but a revolution that challenges the foundational pillars of US democracy, international liberal order and globalization. There was never in the recent history of the United States a hundred days with this level of acceleration, disruption and chaos.
Its level of ambition seems to have no limits. In a recent interview with The AtlanticTrump said: “Unlike my first period, in which my objectives were to govern the United States and survive, in this second I direct the country and the world.”
An imperial democracy
With a submissive Congress – both cameras in the hands of the Republicans – a cabinet composed of loyal and unconditional and a magic movement surrendered to his feet, Trump has used his first 15 weeks to “flood the area” through a tsunami of executive orders (143) – many of them aimed at expanding presidential power and redesigning the state apparatus – and eight statements of national emergency.
Inspired by a maximalist interpretation of the theory of the “Unitary Executive”, Trump has been undermining the rule of law through disobedience to judicial failures and the politicization of the Department of Justice. His attacks on universities, media and critical lawyers, accompanied by budgetary threats and multimillion -dollar demands, evoke tactics of illiberal regimes. Likewise, his failed attempt to fire Jerome Powell, president of the Federal Reserve, and the pressure to reduce the interest rate, reflects his contempt for institutional autonomy and his willingness to subordinate monetary policy to his proposals.
In Migration, another of its priorities, the Alien Act enemy of 1798 has instrumentalized to justify deportations without due process and the transfer of migrants to foreign prisons, such as the Salvadoran penalty of President Nayib Bukele. last week, federal judge Fernando Rodríguez Jr. stopped the deportation of Venezuelans under this law, considering that the use of this rule of war times in the current situation is illegal.
On the other hand, the results of the new government efficiency department (Doge), headed by Elon Musk, have been well below expectations. Despite the dismantling of key agencies and mass dismissals, projected savings have been drastically reduced: from the two billion initially promised dollars it was passed to one billion, and is currently estimated at just 150,000 million.
Protectionism and tariffs
On April 2, Trump declared his “day of liberation” tariff with the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs”, unleashing an unprecedented commercial war that has sunk financial markets, decelerated the global and American economy and increased inflationary risk. Faithful to his style, a few days later he opened a period of suspension for three months, with the aim of carrying out commercial negotiations with more than 100 countries, while a base tariff of 10% on the goods imported to the United States is held in vígor. With China, on the other hand, he climbed his offensive carrying tariffs at 145%, while the Asian giant responded with 125%. The former secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summer described the results of “disastrous” and said: “Perhaps they are the first less successful days of a presidency in economic matters in the last century.”
Scott Besent, secretary of the current treasure, who a few weeks ago said that these levels were unsustainable, will lead Jamieson Greer the representation that will meet this Saturday with the Chinese delegation in Switzerland to address the issue of tariffs and try to lower tensions. Both countries represent 45% of GDP and 20% of world trade.
Resistance vectors
While Congress and the democratic opposition have offered a little resistance, the true brakes to the Maga Revolution come today from three main actors: courts, markets and public opinion.
The judges have begun to issue deportations contrary to due process, the abusive use of emergency powers and in matters of arbitrary dismissals of officials and closure of pubic agencies. The Wall Street reaction to economic uncertainty has forced adjustments in commercial policy. And the surveys reflect a sustained decline: Trump’s approval ranges between 39% and 45%, with disapproval peaks ranging from 55% to 59%.
In the light of these numbers, Trump is the most unpopular president in his first 100 days in the last 70 years. It is not clear if these bad numbers will lead Trump to adjust their policies or, if on the contrary, it will redouble their bet.
A transactional policy
Trump’s foreign policy is unilateral, disruptive and revisionist. Its purpose is not to reform the liberal international order, but replace it with a geopolitical architecture based on the Real policyin the logic of hard power and in agreements between powers with defined areas of influence, a kind of “concert” between the United States, China and Russia, reminiscent of the system that was in force during the nineteenth century in Europe.
The narrative that supports this strategy starts from the premise that the United States has been systematically harmed (a “victim”, in Trump’s words) both for its allies and for its commercial partners and strategic rivals, such as China. Hence his obsession with “recovering American primacy” under the governing principle that national interests must always prevail, even if that implies undermining historical alliances, mistreating their neighbors or dynamiting international organizations. Multilateralism, global pacts, cooperative diplomacy or respect for international law are subordinated to the slogan “America First”.
This doctrine translates into a double standard diplomacy: transactional and pragmatic against great powers, but coercive and blackmailer against weaker or dependent countries.
The result has been an accelerated deterioration of credibility, influence and global leadership of Washington; An erosion that has not been caused by external actions but by self -inflicted damage. At the international level, the United States has ceased to be the “indispensable nation” to become an unpredictable nation. Their withdrawal is leaving strategic gaps that other actors – in special China – will not hesitate to take advantage.
In Latin America
If during his first Trump mandate he ignored Latin America, in this second presidency the region has acquired unpublished visibility, although under a markedly coercive and negative agenda. The strategy privileges discipline over cooperation and imposition on negotiation, with abundance of threats and sanctions, but few incentives, except for ideologically related leaders such as Javier Milei in Argentina, Bukele in El Salvador and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador. For now, more clubs than carrots.
As Juan Gabriel Tokatlian has pointed out, Trump uses Latin America as a “control laboratory”: a test terrain for its foreign policy. From the militarization of the border and mass deportations, to the offensive against fentanil and cartels – raised as terrorist groups -, the imposition of tariffs and rumors of military interventions, their measures have tensioned hemispheric relations without causing an open confrontation, except in the case of Colombia. One of its central strategic objectives is to contain and reduce China’s progress in the region. To implement this policy, Trump has resorted to figures with experience in the region, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and special envoy Mauricio Claver-Carone.
During these first 15 weeks, Latin America, trapped in its fragmentation and polarization, failed to articulate a common response. A survival strategy has predominated: avoid direct clashes, negotiate bilaterally to accommodate, yield in what is necessary and, in some cases, extract immediate benefits.
The consequences have been disparate. As expected, Mexico has concentrated the greatest pressure, followed by Panama, key to the channel and its role in migratory routes. In Central America, countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua are especially vulnerable for their commercial dependence and the weight of remittances. In contrast, most South America countries maintain greater commercial interdependence with China than with Washington.
In short, it is not clear if there is a coherent strategy on the part of the United States or if it is only fragmented initiatives. Will we see real incentives accompanying threats? What role will Trump play at the next summit of the Americas in the Dominican Republic? Will it attend?
On the Latin American side, news and questions also emerge. In an incipient way, initiatives aimed at strengthening regional coordination, diversifying commercial partners and reaffirm multilateralism and sovereignty as the governing principle of foreign policy are created. In this context, Latin America must raise several key issues, including: how to avoid being trapped in the struggle between the United States and China? Is it possible to design a regional position that combines strategic autonomy with constructive links with both power poles?
Great unknown
As stated, the second presidency of Donald Trump does not constitute a simple parenthesis in the institutional history of the United States, but the expression of a deliberate attempt to boost a structural mutation of the American political and cultural system, with long -range projections.
The great unknown is whether we are facing transitory disruption or in front of a deep and lasting transformation. Is Trump an anomaly that will be corrected in the next elections or the symptom of a broader process of structural decline of the US liberal order? Having elapsed just a hundred days of his return to power, it is very early to offer a definitive response. We are only at the beginning of the beginning.
The next hundred days will be decisive to assess whether this disruptive and chaotic project manages to consolidate, or if, on the contrary, the counterweights capable of containing this “imperial presidency” begin to strengthen. The role of the Supreme Court will be key to drawing a firm red line to Trump’s excesses. If not, the consequences would be very serious.
Co-director of radar latam 360
Related news :