June 18, 2023the submersible Titan of the company OceanGate dived to explore the remains of the famous Titanic and suffered a catastrophic implosion in which all five people on board died. This disaster shocked the entire world and raised serious questions about safety and the decisions made by OceanGate leaders.
One year after the disaster, Wired revealed internal documents and interviews with former employees paint a disturbing picture of the company’s work environment and the practices of its CEO, Stockton Rush.
OceanGate, a private company founded in 2009, had established itself as a provider of underwater exploration services, driven by Rush’s dream of taking tourists to the shipwreck of the Titanic. This ambitious goal involved the construction of a revolutionary manned submersible capable of diving to extreme depths. But what was the quest for glory that led to decisions that culminated in tragedy?
In 2016, the Cyclops 2 was in testing at University of Washington in Seattle. This scale model of a new OceanGate submersible was hanging in a capsule in the building’s high-pressure testing facility. Designed with an innovative carbon fiber hull, the Cyclops 2 promised to be lighter and capable of diving deeper than traditional submarines.
The engineers put the model to the test inside a tank, raising the pressure to simulate the conditions at the depth where the Titanic is located (3,800 meters below the sea). Atlantic Ocean, with a pressure of approximately 6,500 psi). 73 minutes into the test and upon reaching the critical pressure level, the model imploded. The building shook violently and loud noises were emitted that caused fear among those present. Despite the clear and indisputable flaw in the design, OceanGate continued with the construction of a full-scale submersible based on the same principles.
Stockton Rush, co-founder of OceanGate, dreamed of changing the way the world viewed underwater exploration. With an ambitious vision, he wanted to take tourists to the resting place of the Titanic and promote a new era of marine exploration.. Rush had initially acquired older submarines, but soon began developing a “revolutionary new manned submersible” that used innovative materials such as carbon fiber.
As OceanGate moved forward with construction of Cyclops 2, later renamed Titan, Rush repeatedly underestimated the importance of extensive testing and warnings from experts. In his pursuit of honors and achievements, he took shortcuts that ultimately proved fatal.
The leaked documents and interviews with former employees detailed by Wired revealed a worrying corporate culture at OceanGate. Employees noted that those who questioned their superiors’ decisions were considered overly cautious and, in some cases, were fired. His own employees will accuse Rush of having repeatedly lied about the progress and critical problems of the Titan, including flaws in its design and construction.
In March 2018, Will Kohnen, an industry expert, drafted a letter signed by more than 30 professionals, urging Rush to subject the Titan to testing by an outside group. However, Rush ignored these warnings and claimed that industry regulations only hindered innovation.
Days after, Mark Negley of Boeing He also warned Rush about the high risk of a significant failure when reaching depths of 4,000 thousand meters and said: “We believe there is a high risk of significant failure at or before reaching 4,000 meters. “We don’t think you have any margin of safety.” Negley provided a graphic analysis showing a skull and crossbones below 4,000 meters, evidencing the danger. However, Rush, guided by his confidence and ambition, dismissed these warnings. and responded: “Titan and its security systems go far beyond anything currently in use.”
One of the main challenges OceanGate faced was the integrity of the Titan’s carbon fiber hull. Despite being a promising material due to its light weight and high strength, carbon fiber had never before been used in a submersible that would operate at such depths. During initial testing, significant deformations were discovered in the hull under compression and on at least one occasion, an extremely worrying crack. An OceanGate pilot informed Rush via email: “The crack is quite serious.”
In early 2020, after multiple failures and unsatisfactory test results, OceanGate sought new contractors to manufacture the hull. The company partnered with Electroimpact and Janicki Industries to build the new hull, but tests continued to fail. In a desperate attempt to save time and costs, it was decided to skip extensive testing of the new procedures and the entire helmet was manufactured without sufficient prior testing.
Pressure over deadlines and costs led the company to make even more dangerous decisions. Rush ruled that titanium rings from the old helmet would be reused for the new helmet, despite warnings from employees and experts about the potential risks.
By 2021, OceanGate had added metal lifting points to the Titan’s interface rings, a decision that may have compromised the submersible’s structural integrity.. While a sling was previously used to lift the submarine, avoiding pressure on critical joints, the new lifting method was not subject to sufficient testing and analysis.
As diving season approached, OceanGate desperately needed income from the Titanic missions. The Titan only had a few relatively shallow dives in Puget Sound before being transported to Newfoundland for its first successful dive on the Titanic in July 2021. Despite initial successes, problems continued to pile up, and the pressure to meet deadlines and justify investments became more intense.
In June 2023, five people prepared for a new dive to the Titanic on board the Titan: Rush; Paul-Henri Nargeolet, a deep-sea explorer; businessman Hamish Harding and a father and son duo, Shahzada and Suleman Dawood. During the dive, the support ship lost contact with the submersible, triggering a massive search and rescue operation that lasted four days.
Finally, remains of the Titan were found, and the US Navy confirmed that it had detected sounds “consistent with an implosion” shortly after losing contact. The tragedy led OceanGate to cease all commercial and exploration activities and the United States Coast Guard launched an international investigation to determine the causes and responsibilities of the deaths.
The Titan disaster shows the inherent dangers of ignoring safety warnings and taking shortcuts in deep-sea exploration. The story of OceanGate and Stockton Rush exemplifies how excessive ambition and disregard for regulations and warnings can have devastating consequences.
Leaked documents and interviews with former employees paint an alarming picture of a company culture where pressure for commercial success and innovation led to reckless decisions. Repeated warnings from experts such as Will Kohnen and Mark Negley were ignored, and flaws in initial testing were overlooked in a desperate attempt to meet increasingly pressing deadlines.
