Less than a month until presidential elections in Venezuela, political tension begins to intensify as the hours go by. The country, hit by years of economic and humanitarian crisis, is preparing for an event that could change the course of its history. However, the repression of Maduro regime raises doubts about the integrity of the electoral process.
The threats that weigh on the elections are multiple and complex. Since accusations of electoral manipulation to concerns about the transparency and security of voting, Venezuelans face an uncertain outlook.
In this context, the sociologist and doctor in Political Science, Héctor Briceñopresented a research, carried out for the Global Observatory of Communication and Democracywhich reveals the existence of significant risks in the majority of electoral centers in Venezuela.
“These are risks that come from multiple sources, but they all converge in hinder, threaten, hinder the free exercise of voting that the voters deserve and that are guaranteed to them,” Briceño said in conversation with Infobae.
“Specific, 86% of the electoral centers, equivalent to 12,000 voting centers, which in turn contain more than 18 million voters, have some type of risk level.“, he added.
According to the researcher, the states of Venezuela with the greatest number of electoral centers at risk are Capital District, Bolivar and Carabobo. However, it is in the country’s border municipalities where it has been most frequently evident that Chavismo operates under suspicion of fraud.
“The greater the risk in the electoral center, the government tends to get a higher percentage of the vote that does not correspond to the behavior of the votes obtained by Chavismo in that same election.in the rest of the electoral centers of that same municipality,” he stated.
According to Briceño, “it is possible that many of these voters are voting under conditions of social coercion. It can be from the supervised voting or assisted votingunder threats of loss of social benefits, loss of employment, etc.
However, he clarifies that “just because an electoral center meets a risk condition does not necessarily have to happen there, but it is probabilistic, that is, the greater the risk, the greater the probability that manipulations, threats and distortions of the popular will will occur in those places.” electoral centers.”
The risk analysis on election day reveals two main dimensions of concern, according to the research conclusions.
The first dimension is character administrative and refers to the decisions made by the National Electoral Council (CNE). These measures impact how voting centers are distributed throughout the national territory and how voters are assigned to these centers. However, the criteria used by the CNE to make these decisions are not transparent, raising doubts about the equity and transparency of the process.
The second dimension focuses on the risks themselves. electoral. These risks include participation and abstention statistics, as well as the possibility that there are electoral centers where the dominance of any political force, whether the government or the opposition, is excessive.
Of the more than 18 million voters that cast their vote in places that present certain levels of electoral vulnerability, nearly one million people vote in places that face administrative challenges, while some 16 million do so in conditions that imply electoral risks. In addition, there are around 1 million voters who are forced to vote in centers that accumulate both types of risks.
The migration crisis In Venezuela it has also had an impact on the country’s electoral behavior, as it is not adequately reflected in the Electoral Registry.
Although it is estimated that there are approximately 7 million Venezuelan migrantsit is estimated that at least 4 million of them are of voting age, but “not all of them were necessarily registered or managed to register on this last day.”
The repercussions of mass migration are reflected in a decrease in votes in large cities, traditionally strongholds of the opposition.
“In the statistics of intention to migrate, that is, surveys that have asked people if they want to leave or not, we have seen that there have been cycles in which voters or sympathizers identified with the opposition have been the ones who have mostly decided. leave,” Briceño revealed.
However, he affirms that there are also followers of Chavismo who have decided to flee the country for various reasons.
“When a Chavista leaves, it is because he has lost faith in the government, he has lost faith in the revolution and before wanting to vote for the opposition, he decides to leave the country.. What I mean by this is that the repercussions for the opposition vote are significant. The opposition has lost a number of votes when they are not allowed to vote. But the government has also lost a significant part of its electorate,” said the sociologist in conversation with Infobae.
“This has had an important consequence because it has reconfigured Venezuelan electoral behavior, especially among the regions or the interior of the country and the large cities,” he added.
The redistribution of the vote in Venezuela has shown notable changes since 2021, revealing a new dynamic in opposition support. According to the results of the regional elections that year, the opposition lost a significant number of votes in large cities, but increased its support in rural regions of the country.
The also doctor in Political Science pointed out that the profile of the opposition electorate has changed drastically compared to 2015.
Now, the opposition vote is focused more on rural zones and less in urban and middle-class areas.
As for the chances of an electoral victory, Nicolas MaduroHéctor Briceño affirmed that the Chavista regime has already decided to resort to fraud for these elections.
“The Government has already been resorting to fraud, continually modifying the conditions of competition, since the disqualification of the candidate or the two opposition candidates who presented themselves, Maria Corina and Corina Yorisobstructing, eliminating or making illegal the cards of a good number of parties, persecuting opposition leaders and sympathizers. In short, I believe that without any of these measures that have already been taken, and which constitute manipulation and electoral fraud, the government cannot become competitive.”
“Today it seems very difficult, extremely uphill for the government to achieve a popular victory, not even using these mechanisms that it has already used, plus other additional ones that it traditionally uses, such as assisted voting, threats and coercion of some voters. But I insist, I think that the scenario is not yet complete. I think that we still have to see some of the moves that both the government and the opposition have prepared,” he said.
