(DNA). – Finally, the libertarian government of Javier Milei achieved in the National Congress the sanction of the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI), included in Title VII of the Bases law and covers 64 articles, ranging from number 164 to 228. In total, the regime contains 12 chapters that deserve to be read carefully to know how it benefits the people of Rio Negro and at what point funds may be passed over to other provinces that already have a productive profile, for example, extractivist. , and that they will see the effects in the short term.
Río Negro puts all its efforts into two large-scale projects that are perhaps comparable to other milestones that made provincial development, such as irrigation and the port: the oil pipeline from Vaca Muerta to Sierra Grande and the possible installation at that point on the maritime coast of a Liquefied Natural Gas plant, to export liquefied gas to the world.
The Atlantic becomes the outlet for Vaca Muerta production, in a project that vindicates Río Negro and generates government effort, which seems to subdue a historical competition between the region with Bahía Blanca, as a maritime gateway that today has part of the income from the fruit of the Upper Valley. It also has railway logistics, from the Alto Valle, which Ferrosur operates.
For years, Bahía Blanca has pushed for several projects in dispute with the province, driven by a local bourgeoisie, “the Corporation”, which defends and promotes tooth and nail any initiative that contributes to the development and growth of Bahía Blanca.
The local bourgeoisies
The implementation of the Large Investment Incentive Regime (RIGI) should not be confused with the Vaca Muerta oil pipeline and LNG plant projects, promoted by YPF, with the support of the state of Río Negro, which have been in place for a long time. The provincial government’s decision to support the Ley Bases in the National Congress has other motivations.
The oil pipeline and LNG were well used to justify the vote of Río Negro, which is its own, but the scenario of provincial wealth, promoted, will have to wait a while to think about future settlements.
The tree cannot cover the forest. First we must insist on the Rio Negro project, which goes from the Atlantic to the Andes, with the bioceanic included, that is, it is essential to offer potential million-dollar investments in dollars, a Rio Negro menu, to avoid investments adjusted solely to the interest of the company to be installed, which is logically only interested in its profit, disconnected from a balanced provincial project with benefits for all Rio Negro residents.
The RIGI is a proposal in expectation, because we also have to see how it is regulated by the national Executive. Nothing more than this, and as a promise it can be used as an electoral campaign flag.
Río Negro has a deficit that it will have to reverse. The large investments that have historically been made have come from the State.
There were no local bourgeoisies that took on these projects to exercise their functions as local promoters of development. Today, for example, the Rio Negro productive economic sectors have not yet expressed their support for the pipeline and the GLN plant, accompanying the State and making a unified provincialist vocation visible to YPF and the national government.
The same thing did not happen as in Bahía Blanca, where its local forces publicly asked, even with a project by Buenos Aires senators from the LLA in La Plata, for Bahía Blanca to be declared a platform for the export and production of liquefied natural gas through its port.
There was no State-private alliance in the province. This local leadership renounced the vanguard role it played in other parts of the country and the world.
This absence was filled by foreign capital, encouraged by some comparative advantages and the attraction of Patagonia. San Carlos de Bariloche can be an example.
Río Negro – beyond Milei – wants to be part of this energy process, adding royalties, funds, incorporating other income in addition to fruit and other exports such as meat, among others with unequal and minimal impact.
There are two levels to these future expectations. First, and where the government is betting and starring, together with YPF, to become Vaca Muerta’s outlet to the sea, and second, to wait and prepare for the benefits that could come with the RIGI.
Río Negro did not have – or were ephemeral – bourgeoisies that considered carrying forward the development and profits of local and regional economies, as vanguards that could even have influenced domestic politics.
There was a lack of will. This could be a definition that is limited to a dependency of these economic sectors on the State, an immobilization and laziness in thinking about transformative projects.
It was precisely the local bourgeoisies who, in other provinces or regions, promoted economic and social development in the countries, but in the province they could not fulfill that role in driving development.
It was the consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie, also called the middle class, which helped, presided over and demonstrated the public-private conjunction, the growth of urban industrial, service and commercial activities, which were taking place in the provinces, especially Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Salta and some others to a lesser extent.
This capitalist development is in debt. There were attempts from sectoral interests such as fruit growing in the Upper Valley or tourism in Bariloche, which generated some tug-of-war between regions. These glimpses of generating a bourgeois vanguard had radicalism as an ally, in some cases.
Local bourgeoisies cannot be generated by decree and they cannot be promoted without economic-financial capacity and without a provincial development bank.
The impetus could be foreseen in Chambers of Commerce, in SME associations or in rural societies.
An idea for debate: to analyse how local alliances are structured that could be subsidiaries of these investments. Today Sierra Grande appears as a possibility.
