Before the general elections that concluded on June 1, it was expected that Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, will return home. His charisma, combined with an emphasis on infrastructure development, welfare payments to the poorest, and a polarizing Hindu nationalism, seemed unbeatable. Modi radiated a confidence that matched those predictions. He stated that his Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) and its allies would win more than 400 seats in the 543-seat parliament.
The final results of the June 4 vote count revealed that Modi’s alliance fell far short of that target. The BJP and its allies won 292 seats, compared to the opposition’s 234. The BJP itself lost 63 seats compared to the last election in 2019, ending with a total of 240, down from 303 in 2019. Crucially, that means it will depend on its alliance partners to control parliament (272 seats are needed to obtain a majority). The spectacle of the faltering Modi machine has shocked the public, the political world and the financial markets: the country’s benchmark stock index fell 6%.
The electoral surprise follows a deeply divisive campaign. From the beginning, opposition politicians and other critics had complained about the lack of a level playing field in the elections. Opposition politicians were jailed on corruption charges they called politically motivated. Congress, the main opposition party, said its bank accounts were frozen, hampering the campaign. Meanwhile, Modi at times used stridently anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric. All this may have been motivated by concern over declining support for the BJP.
The biggest surprise turned out to be the giant northern state of Uttar Pradesh (above), in the BJP’s Hindi-speaking heartland. In 2019, the BJP won 62 of the state’s 80 seats. This time that count fell to 33, with a 9% vote difference away from the BJP and its allies. Thirty-seven seats went to the left-wing Samajwadi Party, which is a member of the opposition alliance and focuses on the rights of lower caste groups and religious minorities. The constituencies lost to the BJP include Faizabad, home to the city of Ayodhya, where Modi inaugurated a large new Hindu temple in January. The temple occupies the site where a Hindu nationalist mob demolished a former mosque in 1992.
The BJP also suffered heavy losses in Rajasthan and in Maharashtra, a rich industrial state in the west that is home to Mumbai, the business capital of India. The seats it lost there were mostly to Congress, which nearly doubled its nationwide seat count to 99, up from 52 in 2019.
What went wrong with the BJP? His overall vote share across India remained more or less the same as in 2019, around 37%. The party also made some small gains in the south and east, where it had previously been unable to make inroads. However, its losses in critical areas like up mean its power in parliament is about to plummet. The feeling that the economy is not delivering for ordinary people may have been a major factor: Despite strong growth numbers, voters cited inflation and unemployment as concerns. The setbacks in Up and Rajasthan may reflect concern among lower-caste members that the BJP could backtrack on affirmative action policies. The opposition had seized on those fears, emphasizing Modi’s closeness to oligarchs and claiming that the BJP could remove constitutional protections for lower-caste groups and religious minorities. Most importantly, the prime minister’s once all-powerful personal appeal has weakened and has been unable to offset these concerns.
Three big questions now arise for India. Firstly, can the BJP form a stable government? The answer is, probably. The BJP will remain by far the largest party in Parliament, with more than twice as many seats as the Congress. Unless there is a major rebellion within the party, Modi will likely be able to continue as prime minister. He will have to reach agreements with two of his alliance partners, Telugu Desam and Janata Dal (United), two regional parties in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh and the eastern state of Bihar, respectively. Their leaders, Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar, will now emerge as kingmakers and will try to curry favor with the BJP in terms of appointments, benefits to their states and policies. Both are already being courted by the opposition alliance. Kumar, in particular, is known for switching sides, which presents a particular risk. However, given the BJP’s deep pockets, Modi could also manage to alienate opposition parties to shore up his alliance.
The second question is how such a government could function, once formed. Modi’s favored style is strongman executive government with little debate in the cabinet or parliament. Now he will have to negotiate and make concessions. That will complicate policymaking, particularly a 100-day agenda that was expected to implement a set of currently stalled labor reforms and modernize policies aimed at boosting manufacturing, including the government’s flagship industrial subsidy plan. Modi may now feel that he needs to pay more attention to the immediate economic needs of groups whose votes his party failed to win by unleashing a new wave of welfare schemes. Fear of less predictable policymaking, fewer reforms, and a waste of social welfare explains the stock market crash.
The final question is how the surprising result changes India in the long term. The idea of Modi ruling for another ten years is now much less likely, as his personal brand has weakened, with the result that the question of succession will loom large. While short-term economic policymaking may deteriorate, a more open policy style could prove useful over time. Many of the most necessary changes to India’s economy – including reforms in land acquisition, the energy sector and agriculture – require cooperation with state governments and politically important social groups such as farmers. India’s reforms in the early 1990s and 2000s were carried out by coalition governments.
There is a danger that the disappointed leader will choose to double down on his more authoritarian tendencies and amplify his polarizing religious rhetoric. Still, fears that India could evolve inexorably toward a more autocratic form of government have subsided: the BJP has failed to win enough seats to push through constitutional changes; opposition parties have been given new life; and debate and dissent will be revitalized. That may be the most lasting consequence of the 2024 general election.
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