The dispute over the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands between Argentina and the United Kingdom has been a constant subject of analysis by multiple States and experts, both due to the war fought in 1982 and the claims that remain latent today. The United States has been one of the main countries that has studied the current dynamics of the conflict, using it as a reference to underpin current disputes in other parts of the world, stating, for example, that the current tensions between China and Taiwan reflect similarities with the Argentine claim. for the Falklands. This is how Lieutenant Anthony Iavarone, of the US Navy, analyzed it.
Iavarone affirms that the Falklands scenario has many more points in common with current Taiwan than any other geopolitical situation in the international system. Both the Atlantic islands and the Pacific archipelago have similarities associated with the claim of two countries, the rejection of the inhabitants of one of them, or the control of one of those States over the territory. “Like China with Taiwan, Argentina has long claimed dominion over the territory of the Malvinas and its inhabitants. As in the case of Taiwan, the inhabitants of the Falklands have rejected the claims of the continent,” highlights the official.
The analysis from a military point of view is necessary for the United States, a country that poses a possible intervention in the event of a conflict in Taiwan against China. The document explains that the Falklands War stood out as the largest air-naval conflict since the Second World War, where the British Royal Navy used to resupply through long-distance supply lines, sending them by plane to a nerve center in the territory. This would be exactly what the United States would have to face during a conflict against China in Taiwan, explains the expert.
Likewise, Iavarone affirms that in a large-scale conflict between the United States and China, the use of satellite images is likely, as in the Malvinas, although the spatial domain would be “degraded.”
In summary, the US Navy lieutenant raises six intelligence indicators from the Falklands War in 1982 that today can be used to “evaluate” China’s intentions towards Taiwan, drawing a parallel with Argentina’s actions in the Falklands. Not only does he propose that the Argentine movements are classified as an invasion that “did not occur in a vacuum,” but that his diplomatic initiatives failed after years of attempts, so “any military action on, in or adjacent to Taiwan will simply be a evolution of diplomatic, political and historical events.
The Malvinas intelligence indicators to be applied in Taiwan
Iavarone presents six focal points to pay attention to and use to analyze the situation in Asia Pacific, based on the war between Argentina and the United Kingdom as a background: a preceding internal crisis; the role of the press; upcoming weapons capacity; diplomatic jostling, an unrelated regional crisis, and the diversion of critical military assets.
On internal crisis, the lieutenant affirms that the Malvinas war was a necessary action for Argentina, considering that obtaining sovereignty over the islands was a national imperative for a large part of the Argentine population. “To unite the country and distract attention from worsening economic problems, the (military) junta sought the ultimate distraction: a war that rectifies an old historical grievance. The junta believed that recovering the Falklands “would cleanse the country and give long-term legitimacy to the regime,” he points out.
Around the role of the pressIavarone explains that a year before the conflict in the Atlantic, the Argentine media wrote that “the only thing that can save this government is a war,” with that same newspaper expressing “Argentina’s intentions,” stating that if If the attempt to resolve the negotiations with the United Kingdom failed, the country would take the islands by force.
When talking about a upcoming weapons capacitythe author refers to how the “invasion” by Argentina felt assured by having additional French Super Étendard attack fighters, equipped with Exocet missiles, which were expected to arrive in July 1982 in order to equalize the country with British military capacity.
The American lieutenant also highlights that there was a last “diplomatic push” on the part of Argentina, which imposed ultimatums on the United Kingdom to talk about sovereignty but, at the same time, sought to chill the dialogue between the parties as a justification for military action. Likewise, it couples the role of the press with this indicator, highlighting that the media “repeated like a parrot” the plans of the Argentine government.
When talking about a unrelated regional crisis, Iavarine points out the actions of Argentines on South Georgia Island when they raise an Argentine flag in “sovereign British territory.” This led to the HMS Endurance being sent to evict the Argentines and dissuade them from further similar actions. However, this previous “crisis” caused the board to start its plans months ahead of schedule.
Lastly, about the diversion of critical military assets from a previously announced commitment, The lieutenant explains that during this latest incident, the Argentine Navy was carrying out a large bilateral exercise with Uruguay, but that the dispatch of HMS Endurance caused Argentina to divert corvettes from these exercises and move heavy equipment to the main air and sea bases.
How are the similarities between the Malvinas and Taiwan raised?
Regarding the aforementioned, the analysis by American Lieutenant Iavarone concludes by stating that all the indicators or events in the Malvinas can easily be transferred to the situation in the Pacific between China and Taiwan. But is what happened in 1982 actually similar to the current claims of the Asian giant over the archipelago? This analysis takes Argentina’s role as an invader for granted, posing a marked bias by equating the country’s position with China’s current intentions in Taiwan and ignoring Argentina’s historic claim to the Islands, with credible historical foundations.
Iavarone not only suggests that for the United States to continue deterring Chinese actions against Taiwan, it is important to “precisely evaluate its intentions and react accordingly,” but also points out the parallels between China and Argentina. The official claims that an unrelated regional crisis like what happened in South Georgia could happen in the South China Sea, becoming a casus belli that spirals into the Taiwan Strait.
The US official also bases his opinion on the fact that the conflict in the Malvinas was “manufactured” by Argentina, and that a similar situation could be carried out by China, where it would “accelerate Chinese designs towards Taiwan.” “Just as the dispute over South Georgia between the United Kingdom and Argentina ultimately led to the Falklands War, a secondary conflict that allows China to expand its conflict into the Taiwan Strait and into Taiwan itself enables a narrative of self-defense,” highlights Iavarone.
However, is it correct to recreate a war scenario that occurred in another era and transfer it to another continent with different characteristics, history and intentions? The truth is that the theory is not always consistent with current contextual elements, and recreating biased historical parallels may not contribute to the objective geopolitical and military analysis.
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